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PERP WALKS AND PROSECUTORIAL
ETHICS
Ernest F. Lidge III*
"The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be
induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influence, whether of private talks or public print." -Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes1
I. INTRODUCTION
The perp walk has been defined as: "[t]he deliberate escorting of an
arrested suspect by police in front of the news media, especially as a means of
pressuring or humiliating the suspect."' Law enforcement personnel have been
using perp walks for many years,3 and the procedure has been used in some
high-profile cases in recent decades.4 The perp walk has two potential effects:
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Chicago, Illinois, 1981; J.D., University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois, 1984. I would like
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Memphis School of Law for providing a grant that supported the research for this Article.
I Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
2 The AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000).
1 A New York Times article notes:
The term [perp walk] has been used for at least five decades by New York police and photogra-
phers and some experts point to images of protowalks captured long before photography. In
paintings of the expulsion from Eden, Adam and Eve are modestly trying to cover their bodies
from public view, and the sword-wielding angel's stem expression anticipates the look on a
homicide detective walking an accused cop-killer. Other paintings - of Achilles ceremonially
dragging Hector behind his chariot, of the Stations of the Cross, of French aristocrats being
carted to the guillotine - display elements of the perp walk, although the spectators appear far
more polite than the New York press corps is.
John Tierney, Walking the Walk, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 30, 1994, at 30. See also Dave
Krajicek, The Crime Beat: Perp Walks, in COVERING CRIME AND JUSTICE (Criminal Justice
Journalists eds. 2003), http://www.justicejournalism.org/crimeguide/chapterO1/sidebars/
chap0lxside5.html (stating that "[f]ederal authorities have been fond of perp walks since
the early years of the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover, who understood the priceless public relations
value of an image that showed a cuffed bad guy in the grasp of a federal agent").
I See Krajicek, supra note 3 (stating that Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber,
"was subjected to a perp walk nearly three hours before he was officially arrested"); Joel
Cohen, No More 'Perp Walks,' NAT'L L.J., Aug. 5, 2002, at A25 (describing then-U.S.
Attorney Rudolph Guiliani's 1987 arrest of three Wall Street Bankers who were "handcuffed
and arrested at their desk" and noting the "recent front-page arrests of ImClones's Sam
Waksal and Adelphia's John Rigas .. .although voluntary surrenders were urged by their
lawyers in meeting with prosecutors"); Editorial, 'Perp Walks' and Watchdogs can Thwart
Corporate Crime, USA TODAY, July 9, 2004, at 10 (stating that Enron's Kenneth Lay was
perp walked in handcuffs).
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shaming the accused and generating publicity for law enforcement. The perp
walk has been criticized,5 but constitutional challenges to perp walks have met
with very limited success.6
This Article examines another possible challenge to perp walks -
prosecutorial ethics, namely Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8 of the American Bar
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"). Model
Rule 3.8(f) requires prosecutors to "refrain from making extrajudicial com-
ments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of
the accused" unless the comments are "necessary to inform the public of the
nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and .. .serve a legitimate law
enforcement purpose."7 Similarly, Model Rule 3.6 bars a lawyer who is
involved "in the investigation or litigation of a matter" from making "an extra-
judicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be
disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter." 8
This Article discusses the application of Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8 to perp
walks. Part II of the Article examines a threshold issue. Rules 3.6 (a) and 3.8
(f) apply to "statements" or "comments." Is a perp walk a statement or com-
ment? Part II concludes that a perp walk arranged with the media by law
enforcement should be considered a statement or comment for purposes of dis-
cipline under the ethical rules.
Part III of the Article discusses Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8's limitations on
prosecutorial extrajudicial statements. This part concludes that, under many
circumstances, a perp walk can violate Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8 by having "a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing [the criminal trial]"9 and by
having "a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the
accused."l°
Both Model Rule 3.6 and Model Rule 3.8 authorize certain extrajudicial
statements. For example, Model Rule 3.6(b)(5) allows a lawyer to make "a
Another example is Lee and Andrew Fastow of Enron Corporation fame, who alleged
that the government refused to allow them to surrender voluntarily, instead conducting a
perp walk. See United States v. Fastow, 292 F. Supp. 2d 914, 918 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
1 See e.g., Cohen, supra note 4, Kyle J. Kaiser, Note, Twenty-First Century Stocks and
Pillory: Perp Walks as Pre-Trial Punishment, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1205 (2003). One wag has
described the effects of perp walks in the following manner:
Q: Why have some companies canceled casual Fridays?
A: So people will always have jackets to cover the handcuffs.
Randy Myers, Lessons of the Scandal Trials, CORP. BOARD MEMBER MAG., Special Legal
Issue 2004, available at http://www.boardmember.comlissues/archive.pl?article-id= 11973.
6 In Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000), a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action, the
court held that a perp walk staged by police violated an arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights
but that the police officer was entitled to qualified immunity. Prior to Lauro no court
imposed constitutional liability based on a perp walk. See Hannah Shay Chanoine, Note,
Clarifying the Joint Action Test for Media Actors When Law Enforcement Violates the
Fourth Amendment, 104 COL. L. REV. 1356, 1357 n. 9 (2004) (listing cases).
7 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(0 (2005).
I d. R. 3.6(a).
9 Id.
10 Id. R. 3.8(f).
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request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information."'' It has been
argued that perp walks may assist in the gathering of evidence and informa-
tion.' 2 Similarly, Model Rule 3.8(f) allows prosecutors to make statements that
are "necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's
action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose."' 3 It has been
argued that perp walks may serve legitimate law enforcement purposes. Part
III addresses these arguments.
Although prosecutors themselves are sometimes involved in arranging a
perp walk, at other times police officers may conduct a perp walk without a
prosecutor's involvement. Model Rule 3.8(f) requires prosecutors to "exercise
reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees
or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case
from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited
from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule."' 4 Part IV of this Article discusses a
prosecutor's duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent law enforcement per-
sonnel from making prejudicial extrajudicial statements, including perp walks.
In Part V the Article concludes that perp walks often violate a prosecutor's
ethical duties. Other less prejudicial alternatives exist to meet legitimate law
enforcement goals. In most circumstances, therefore, prosecutors have an ethi-
cal duty to avoid conducting perp walks. Prosecutors must also try to prevent
law enforcement personnel from conducting perp walks, or, failing that, prose-
cutors must take steps to ameliorate the harm, including publicly condemning
law enforcement personnel who conduct perp walks.
II. Is A PERP WALK A "STATEMENT" OR "COMMENT"?
Both Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8(f) proscribe certain extrajudicial "state-
ments" or "comments." Does a perp walk constitute a "statement" or "com-
ment"?' 5 One dictionary defines the word "statement" to mean "the act of
stating or declaring."' 6 The same dictionary also defines the word "statement"
to include "an overall impression or mood intended to be communicated, espe-
cially by means other than words ... ." "7 One of the definitions in WordNet is
"a nonverbal message.' 8 The hearsay rules also include nonverbal communi-
cations as statements. The Federal Rules of Evidence define a "statement" as,
'' Id. R. 3.6(b)(5).
12 See Chanonine, supra note 6, at 1368 (discussing possible justifications for perp walks
including that they "may encourage unknown witnesses to step forward with information").
13 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2005).
14 Id.
15 Rules 3.6 and 3.8(f) appear to use the terms "statements" and "comments" interchangea-
bly. Rule 3.8(f) states "except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the
nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement
purpose, [a prosecutor shall] refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a sub-
stantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused .... " Id. at R. 3.8(f)
(emphasis added). Model Rule 3.6 uses the term "statement(s)" throughout the Rule and
accompanying comments (see id. R. 3.6(a); R. 3.6(c); R. 3.6 cmts. 3, 4, 7, and 8) and also
uses the terms "commentary" (R. 3.6 cmt. 3) and "comments" (R. 3.6 cmt. 6).
16 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1694 (4th ed. 2000).
17 Id.
18 WordNet, http://www.answers.com/topic/statement (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
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"(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion."' 9
A perp walk easily falls within the definition of a "statement." The prose-
cutor, by contacting the media, intends to communicate something. At the very
least, the prosecutor intends to communicate to the public that the accused has
been arrested and is in custody. Other possible ideas communicated may
include: (1) the police and prosecutors are doing a great job in protecting the
public; (2) the accused is "guilty, guilty, guilty"; 20 or (3) the accused is being
treated as he deserves - in a humiliating fashion.
Common sense tells us that the proscriptions of Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8
should not be limited to verbal statements. For example, Comment 5(1) to
Model Rule 3.6 states that among the "subjects that are more likely than not to
have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding" include the "criminal record
of a . . . suspect in a criminal investigation .. "..-21 If, at a press conference
about the arrest of a suspect, a reporter asked the prosecutor whether the sus-
pect had a criminal record, the proper response should be "no comment." If the
prosecutor nodded his head up and down, instead of saying "yes," the mere fact
that the prosecutor gave a nonverbal response should not bar discipline.
If a prosecutor arranges a perp walk with the media, the fact that the pros-
ecutor initiated the telephone call meets the requirement of Model Rule 3.6(a)
that the "lawyer knows or reasonably should know [the statement] will be dis-
seminated by means of public communication"22 and/or the requirement of
Rule 3.8(f) that the statement "have a substantial likelihood of heightening pub-
lic condemnation of the accused ....
Arguably, even the phone call to the media itself could fall within the
proscriptions of Model Rule 3.8(f). The call to the media that the defendant
will be taken into custody at a certain time and place is itself a "statement" that
has "a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the
accused."
'24
III. MODEL RULES 3.6(A) AND 3.8(F) AND PERP WALKS
Model Rule 3.6(a) bans a lawyer who is involved in "the investigation or
litigation of a matter" from "mak[ing] an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public
communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.",25 Comment 5 to Model Rule 3.6
lists a number of subjects "that are more likely than not to have a material
prejudicial effect on a proceeding," including "the character, credibility [or]
19 FED. R. EvID. 801. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1444 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
statement as " [a] verbal assertion or nonverbal conduct intended as an assertion").
20 Janine Jackson, "Perp Walks" and Ride-Alongs, EXTRA!, JULY/AUG. 1999, available at
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1469 (quoting Ray Suarez, But What if the 'Perp'
Walks?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1999).
21 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 5(1) (2005).
22 Id. R. 3.6(a).
23 Id. R. 3.8(f).
24 Id.
25 Id. R. 3.6(a).
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reputation ...of a party";2 6 "any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a
defendant or suspect in a criminal case"; 27 "information that the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and
that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial
trial;"2 8 and "the fact that the defendant has been charged with a crime, unless
there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an
accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven
guilty." 2
9
The extrajudicial statements of prosecutors have a great potential for
prejudice. As stated by Professor Charles Wolfram, since "prosecutor state-
ments are typically more likely to influence prospective jurors, Rule 3.6 ... can
be violated more readily by prosecutors in criminal cases than by defense law-
yers or by lawyers in any other setting. '"30
Because of the unique responsibilities of prosecutors,31 there is a special
rule that applies only to them, Model Rule 3.8. Section (f) of Model Rule 3.8
provides that "except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of
the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law
enforcement purpose, [prosecutors must] refrain from making extrajudicial
comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemna-
tion of the accused .... 32 Comment 5 of Rule 3.8 refers back to Rule 3.6,
stating that:
Paragraph (f) supplements Rule 3.6, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that
have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the con-
text of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the
additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the
announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe conse-
quences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have
no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increas-
ing opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the
statement in which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6(b) or
3.6(c).3 3
These ethical rules carry out the policy expressed by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada:34
The outcome of a criminal trial is to be decided by impartial jurors, who know as
little as possible of the case, based on material admitted into evidence before them in
a court proceeding. Extrajudicial comments on, or discussion of, evidence which
26 Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 5(1).
27 Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 5(4).
28 Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 5(5).
29 Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 5(6).
30 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics ' 12.2, at 635 (1986). See also Attor-
ney Grievance Cmm'n of Md. v. Gansler, 835 A.2d 548, 559 (Md. 2003) (noting that
"[c]omments by prosecuting attorneys, in particular, have the inherent authority of the gov-
ernment and are more likely to influence the public").
31 See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
32 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2005).
33 Id. R. 3.8 cmt. 5.
34 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
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might never be admitted at trail and ex parte statements by counsel giving their ver-
sion of the facts obviously threaten to undermine this basic tenet.
35
Perp walks violate Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8. A perp walk, showing the
accused being marched away by police in handcuffs, seen by numerous viewers
could easily "have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing" the trial.
Potential jury members will see the accused looking guilty. In Lauro v.
Charles,3 6 the court noted that the perp walk displays the accused "to the
world, against his will, in handcuffs, and in a posture connoting guilt. ' 37 As
stated by National Public Radio host Ray Suarze in a New York Times op-ed
column, even if the journalists use "all the right words - 'accused' and
'alleged' and 'according to police,"' the photographs say "guilty, guilty,
guilty."
38
One court, in rejecting a § 1983 challenge to a perp walk and defending
the use of the device, unintentionally demonstrated the taint of guilt caused by
perp walks. In Caldarola v. County of Westchester,39 the court said that perp
walks "serve[d] the . . . serious purpose of educating the public about law
enforcement efforts. The image of the accused being led away to contend with
the justice system powerfully communicates government efforts to thwart the
criminal element, and it may deter others from attempting similar crimes." 40
The court seemed to imply that the accused was part of "the criminal element"
and had committed crimes. But not all perp walked defendants are guilty. Not
all arrestees subject to perp walks have been convicted, and the accused indi-
viduals are entitled to the presumption of innocence under our criminal justice
system.4
Perp walks, as discussed by one commentator, are a type of pre-trial pun-
ishment.42 The commentator noted that even without being perp walked, an
arrestee could suffer "long-term harm":
Although he was never perp walked, Richard Jewell was branded a terrorist and
tormented even after his charges were dismissed. Suspects displayed on "John TV,"
where the police directly broadcast arrest information on public access television, are
at risk of being ostracized from their families and their communities before being
convicted. Especially for those who are acquitted, the mental image created in the
35 Id. at 1070.
36 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000).
37 Id. at 212 n.7.
31 Jackson, supra note 20.
39 343 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2003).
40 Id. at 572-73 (emphasis added).
41 The most notorious example is, of course, Michael Jackson, who was paraded in front of
the media as he was arrested and was subsequently acquitted. There are other examples. A
former prosecutor discussed the use of perp walks by one of our country's foremost
politicians:
In 1987, at the height of then-U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani's insider trading war, he had three
Wall Street investment bankers handcuffed and arrested at their desks. When one demanded an
immediate trial, Giuliani had the case dismissed (without prejudice) to avoid a speedy trial viola-
tion, since the government wasn't ready for trial. Much later, two pleaded guilty to relatively
minor charges. The third case was never pursued, but a reputation was ruined. This abusive
exercise of the arrest power is still remembered.
Cohen, supra note 4.
42 See Kaiser, supra note 5.
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public eye is no less than that which would occur from a few hours in the pillory or
from a paddling handed down by a judge. These examples demonstrate how public-
ity can affect the view of a suspect's guilt. The effects would be magnified exponen-
tially when the police would intend such an effect through a staged or choreographed
perp walk.
4 3
Several of the factors contained in Comment 5 to Model Rule 3.6 also
support the idea that perp walks violate the Rule. Comment 5 states that there
are "certain subjects that are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial
effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to . . .a criminal matter
.... ,4 Included are "subjects [that] relate to... the character, credibility [or]
reputation ... of a ... suspect in a criminal investigation ...."-4 Showing the
suspect carried off in handcuffs and surrounded by police certainly "relates to"
that suspect's "character, credibility [or] reputation." Another category of sub-
jects listed in Comment 5 "relate to . . . any opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case. .". ,,4' Handcuffing the defendant
and parading him before the news media certainly relates to law enforcement
personnel's "opinion as to the guilt or innocence of [the] defendant." In addi-
tion, the appearance of the defendant in handcuffs, surrounded by police, is
"information... likely to be inadmissible as evidence ... "47 another prejudi-
cial subject listed in Comment 5.
Finally, the Comment lists as a prejudicial subject "the fact that the defen-
dant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement
explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is
presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty." A perp walk is a statement
that "the defendant has been charged with a crime," but it is unlikely that prose-
cutors conscientiously follow perp walks with a statement that the defendant is
presumed innocent. Even if prosecutors made such a comment, the statement
could not overcome the prejudicial effects of the television pictures.
Comment 6 to Model Rule 3.6 also warns that of all types of proceedings,
"[c]riminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech." 48 Thus
prosecutors have a duty to take extra care to guard against extrajudicial prejudi-
cial speech. Prosecutors have special ethical responsibilities in our system of
justice. As the Model Rules state, "[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility car-
43 id. at 1237-38.
' MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 5 (2005). Previously these factors had
been part of the text of the rule itself. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b)
(1983); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1033, 1061 (1991). After Gentile, the
ABA moved this text to the Comment. See Sebrina A. Mason, Comment, Policing the
Police: How Far Must a Prosecutor Go to Keep Officers Quiet?, 26 S. ILL U. L.J. 317, 318
n.9 (2002) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 annot. (1999) where it is noted
that in 1994, "Model Rule 3.6 was substantially amended.., to address the Supreme Court's
holding in Gentile.").
41 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 5(1).
46 Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 5(4).
47 Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 5(5).
48 Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 6.
Fall 2006]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
ries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural
justice . . . .,
In addition to Model Rule 3.6, Model Rule 3.8(0 seems designed for perp
walks. This Rule says that "except for statements that are necessary to inform
the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a
legitimate law enforcement purpose, [prosecutors must] refrain from making
extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public
condemnation of the accused . O..."50 There probably is almost nothing that
will heighten public condemnation of the accused more than a perp walk. As
discussed below,5 1 perp walks are rarely necessary to provide information to
the public and, in most cases, there are much less prejudicial alternatives to
satisfy legitimate law enforcement purposes.
Prosecutors have been disciplined for making statements that create the
taint of guilt. In Attorney Grievance Committee v. Gansler,52 prosecutor
Douglas Gansler was reprimanded for a number of extrajudicial statements.
Some of these statements included discussing Gansler's personal opinion as to
the defendant's guilt. For example, Gansler announced a plea offer and a dead-
line for its acceptance. In other cases, Gansler indicated that the authorities had
"apprehended the person who committed the crimes."5 3 Maryland's version of
Model Rule 3.6 "specifically addresse[d] attorney comments discussing 'any
opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant."' 5 4 The court said that
Gansler's statements "blatantly expressed" his "opinion of the guilt of the
[defendant]." 5 5 The prejudicial effects of the statements were aggravated by
the fact that Gansler was a prosecutor. As the court pointed out, prosecutors
play a unique role in our criminal justice system and are therefore held to a
higher standard. In addition, "a prosecutor's opinion of guilt is much more
likely to create prejudice, given that his or her words carry the authority of the
government and are especially persuasive in the public's eye."5 6 Prosecutors,
therefore, have to "be even more cautious [than other attorneys] to avoid mak-
ing potentially prejudicial extrajudicial statements."5 7 The court found that
"Gansler knew or should have known that his public opinions of [the defen-
dant's] guilt would have a substantial likelihood of material prejudice," and
therefore found that the statements violated Maryland's version of Model Rule
3.6.58
49 Id. R. 3.8 cmt. 1. See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that
the prosecutor's interest "is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done" and
that while the prosecutor may strike "hard blows," he is "not at liberty to strike foul ones");
Walker v. State, 818 A.2d 1078, 1098 (Md. 2003) (stating that "[p]rosecutors are held to
even higher standards of conduct than other attorneys due to their unique role as both advo-
cate and minister of justice").
'0 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(0 (2005).
51 See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
52 835 A.2d 548 (2003).
53 Id. at 571.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 572.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 573.
51 Id. The text of Model Rule 3.6 is slightly different from Maryland's Rule 3.6 at issue in
Gansler. Model Rule 3.6 does not contain an express reference to "any opinion as to the
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The court noted that the limits on extrajudicial statements are grounded in
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to a fair trial.59 A criminal defen-
dant can be "deprived of a fair trial if circumstances occurring outside the
courtroom taint the proceedings."60 The court noted that attorneys have a
unique role in the criminal justice system and have more knowledge and under-
standing about what is going on in a particular case. Therefore, their speech
has a "degree of credibility ... that an ordinary citizen's speech may not usu-
ally possess. 61 This is particularly true of prosecutors because they have the
inherent authority of the government and are more likely to influence the pub-
lic. Therefore, the defendant's right to a fair trail can be harmed by a prosecu-
tor's extrajudicial speech.62
Another case dealing with a prosecutor's extrajudicial statements was In
re Sims.6 3 In Sims, a number of elected officials and county residents peti-
tioned to remove a prosecutor, John Sims, from office. Along with many other
acts and omissions, Sims had made a number of improper public statements
about current and prospective cases.' Regarding certain subjects of an investi-
gation, Sims told a newspaper that "the reason they don't trust me is that they
can't control me and most criminals don't trust prosecutors."65 After Sims
filed a criminal complaint against one of the petitioners and that complaint had
been dismissed, Sims told a newspaper editor that he planned to charge the
petitioner with a crime. After filing the charges, Sims gave extensive inter-
views to newspapers and television reporters - statements that the court found
violated West Virginia's version of Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8.66
In another incident, Sims told a newspaper that he could not comment on a
case before the grand jury. However, he named an individual and then said that
the individual "had a personal interest, albeit indirectly ... The court
found this comment to violate West Virginia's version of Model Rule 3.6.68
Sims also violated Rule 3.6 when, before the start of jury selection for a murder
trial, he made the following public statement: "We have tried two men
involved with these murders already. This will be a very similar trail with
similar witnesses testifying. We anticipate a similar guilty verdict." 69
The statements made by Sims tended to suggest that individuals were
guilty of a crime. Therefore, the statements violated West Virginia's version of
Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8. The court found that Sims had "used pre-hearing
guilt or innocence of a defendant." Instead, the reference is contained in Comment 5 as one
of the subjects "that are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on the
proceeding." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 5 (2005). See also supra note
44 (discussing the evolution of Model Rule 3.6).
'9 Gansler, 835 A.2d at 558.
60 Id. at 559.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 In re Sims, 523 S.E.2d 273 (W. Va. 1999).
64 Id. at 275-76.
65 Id. at 276 (emphasis in the original).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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publicity to prejudice adjudicative proceedings" and this constituted official
misconduct and malfeasance.70 Because of these statements, and a great deal
of other misconduct, the court ordered that Sims be immediately removed from
the office of prosecuting attorney.7 '
Gansler and Sims demonstrate that statements tending to suggest guilt on
the part of a suspect or arrestee are the kind of statements that violate Model
Rule 3.6(a) because the statements "have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing" a trial. A perp walk suggests guilt in even more graphic terms
than a verbal statement.
In a situation analogous to perp walks, the United States Supreme Court
has recognized that a defendant's appearance in handcuffs before juries can
erode the presumption of innocence. In Deck v. Missouri,72 Carmen Deck had
been convicted of robbing, shooting, and killing an elderly couple. 73 At his
sentencing hearing, Deck was placed in leg irons, handcuffs, and a belly chain.
Deck's counsel objected several times, but the trial court overruled the objec-
tions and, on appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Deck's sentence. 4
According to the Missouri Supreme Court, Deck had not shown the extent to
which the jury had been aware of the restraints, Deck had not claimed that he
had been prevented from participating in the sentencing hearing, and there was
a risk that Deck might try to flee custody.
In deciding whether visible restraints at the sentencing hearing may violate
a defendant's constitutional rights, the Supreme Court first considered whether
a State could routinely shackle a defendant during the guilt phase. The Court
stated: "The answer is clear: The law has long forbidden routine use of visible
shackles during the guilt phase; it permits a State to shackle a criminal defen-
dant only in the presence of a special need."'76 The Court noted that this rule
was deeply rooted in the common law.7 7 Already in the eighteenth century,
Blackstone had said that it was an "ancient" principle that a defendant "must be
brought to the bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds; unless
there be evident danger of an escape."7 8 The Court also cited several other
eighteenth century sources, noting that American courts had long followed
Blackstone's rule that "trial courts may not shackle defendants routinely, but
only if there is a particular reason to do so.79
The Court reviewed some of its own cases dealing with the issue. These
cases suggested that the due process guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments required that "trial courts ... not shackle defendants routinely,
but only if there [was] a particular reason to do so."'80 In Illinois v. Allen, 81 the
70 Id. at 281.
71 Id.
72 544 U.S. 622 (2005).
73 Id. at 624.
74 Id. at 625.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 626.
77 Id.
78 Id. (quoting W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 317 (1769)).
79 Id. at 627.
80 id.
81 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
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Court had said that binding and gagging "an unusually obstreperous criminal
defendant" might "be the fairest and most reasonable way" of managing him,
but "even to contemplate such a technique ... arouses a feeling that no person
should be tried while shackled and gagged except as a last resort."'82 In Hol-
brook v. Flynn,83 the Court, in dicta, stated that shackling a defendant at trial
was an "inherently prejudicial practice that... should be permitted only where
justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial."84 In Estelle v.
Williams,85 the Court said that only an "essential state policy" would justify
requiring a defendant to attend a trial in prison clothing because such an
appearance threatened the trial's fairness.86
In Deck, the Court held that the due process guarantees of the Fifth and
Fourteenth amendments "prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the
jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of discretion, that they
are justified by a State interest specific to a particular trial."87 The Court iden-
tified three "fundamental legal principles" that required the rule.88 One of the
principles, dealing with the defendant's constitutional right to a meaningful
defense, a right to counsel, and the ability to communicate with that counsel
and participate in his own defense, is not particularly relevant to the perp walk
problem. However, the other two principles are very relevant. The first reason
the Court gave for restricting visible restraints is that "the criminal process
presumes that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty." 89 According to
the Court, "visible shackling undermine[d] the presumption of innocence and
the related fairness of the fact finding process" and "suggested to the jury that
the justice system itself [saw] a 'need to separate a defendant from the commu-
nity at large.' "90
The other fundamental legal principle implicated by perp walks was that
"judges must seek to maintain a judicial process that is a dignified process."'"
The Court explained:
The courtroom's formal dignity, which includes the respectful treatment of defend-
ants, reflects the importance of the matter at issue, guilt or innocence, and the gravity
with which Americans consider any deprivation of an individual's liberty through
criminal punishment. And it reflects a seriousness of purpose that helps to explain
the judicial system's power to inspire the confidence and to affect the behavior of a
general public whose demands for justice our courts seek to serve. The routine use of
shackles in the presence of juries would undermine these symbolic yet concrete
objectives. 92
82 Id. at 342-44; see also Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 627-28 (2005).
83 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
84 Id. at 568-69; see also Deck, 544 U.S. at 628.
85 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
86 Id. at 505; see also Deck, 544 U.S. at 628.
87 Deck, 544 U.S. at 629.
88 Id. at 630.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 631.
92 Id. (emphasis added).
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The Deck Court concluded that using shackles at trial offended judicial dig-
nity.93 The Court held that these three considerations also applied during the
penalty phase of a capital case, and therefore courts could not "routinely place
defendants in shackles or other physical restraints visible to the jury during the
penalty phase of a capital proceeding."94 The Court, however, said that such
restraints could be allowed in special circumstances.95
The same considerations that concerned the Deck Court also apply to perp
walks. Parading the accused, restrained by police or in shackles, before the
cameras "undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness"9 6
of the upcoming trial. The public, from whom the jury will be drawn, will see
the defendant as a threat to the community. This kind of "statement," under-
mining the presumption of innocence, is precisely the concern of Model Rules
3.6 and 3.8(f).
In addition, the perp walk undermines the dignity of the criminal justice
system. Although a perp walk does not take place in the court room, the device
ignores the Deck Court's concern about "the respectful treatment of defend-
ants."9 7 This disrespectful treatment of the defendant occurs before the public,
including potential jurors, and undermines the "symbolic yet concrete objec-
tives" enunciated by the Deck Court.98
Since law enforcement personnel cannot normally parade a criminal
defendant before the jury in handcuffs, neither should law enforcement person-
nel parade a defendant before potential jurors in the public in handcuffs. As
one commentator has noted:
Essentially, before, during, and after trial, a prosecutor should make no comments
that may prejudice the defendant. The rules of evidence provide a helpful rule of
thumb in deciding what a prosecutor can and cannot discuss with the press: If the
evidentiary rules bar a matter from being raised at trial, then that same matter should
not be aired before the press.
99
The rules of evidence would not normally allow a prosecutor to show the jury a
videotape of the defendant's arrest. Neither should a prosecutor arrange to
show the defendant's arrest before the public.
On the other hand, commentators have identified some possible justifica-
tions for perp walks. First, perp walks may deter criminal conduct because
"[t]he bold image of a bound defendant may scare others straight."'" Second,
perp walks "arguably serve to soothe public outrage.'' ° Third, perp walks
"encourage guilty pleas and cooperation in current investigations."'0 2 Fourth,
93 Id.
94 Id. at 633.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 630.
97 Id. at 631.
98 Id.
99 Richard W. Holmes, Comment, Prosecutorial Dealing With the Media: Duties, Reme-
dies, and Liability, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 177, 179 (2003-2004).
"o Chanoine, supra note 6, at 1368 (quoting Maro Robbins, Some Call 'Perp Walk' an
Inconsistent Ritual: Councilmen Were Paraded in Cuffs, but Not Ex-AG, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 17, 2003, at IA).
io1 Id.
102 Id.
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they "may induce witnesses or victims to come forward" with information.' °3
Fifth, they provide public access to the justice system, permitting "the public to
witness a facet of how law enforcement administers justice on the public's
behalf."'" 4 Sixth, perp walks expose "an arrested suspect's physical condition,
leading some observers to believe that police are less likely to beat a suspect
who will be exposed to the media."' 5
In most circumstances, these rationales will not justify a perp walk. Deter-
ring future criminal conduct is not a proper justification. Although it may be
proper to show the incarceration of convicted criminals in order to deter others
from committing similar criminal conduct, it is not proper to punish an accused,
but not convicted, person who maintains the presumption of innocence. The
same rationale could be used for denying bail to the accused or punishing him
in other ways.
Similarly, conducting a perp walk to "soothe public outrage" is not a
proper rationale. It is not law enforcement's job to assuage public anger by
humiliating a presumptively innocent individual and harming that individual's
chances for a fair trial.
Neither are the remaining rationales very compelling. Encouraging others
to plead guilty and to cooperate in criminal investigations can be accomplished
by simply announcing the arrest of the defendant. Again, it is not proper to
harm a presumptively innocent individual to pressure others to plead guilty and
cooperate. In addition, such pressure may cause innocent people to accept a
plea agreement. In regard to encouraging unknown witnesses to come forward,
if this is really necessary, a simple mug shot of the defendant would do the
trick.
Finally, allowing the public to experience a "facet of how law enforcement
administers justice," is not much of a justification. Surely the public knows
that a defendant has to be transported from place to place. Not much informa-
tion is gained by the public, except in rare circumstances like the Lee Harvey
Oswald case, where there was concern about the police abusing the arrestee. 1
0 6
The rare circumstance in which this is the case does not justify humiliating a
defendant. There are surely other ways to reassure the public about prisoner
safety. One could grant a lawyer access to the defendant, or if the defendant is
unrepresented, the police could grant access to a reporter (minus his camera).
The costs and abuses of perp walks are manifest. As noted by one com-
mentator, perp walks are seen by some as "serving publicity-hungry prosecu-
tors eager to enhance their political careers" and "giv[ing] police officers a
chance to get on television."' 07 Some criminal defense lawyers perceive perp
walks as "an unethical attempt by police to skirt the Fifth Amendment's protec-
103 Id. See also Nicholas E. Poser, Perp Walk Decision Leaves Troubling Questions, 19
COMM. LAW. 3, 7 (2001).
104 Chanoine, supra note 6, at 1369.
105 Id. See also Poser, supra note 103, at 7 (noting that "the Dallas police intended for the
press to photograph the transfer of Lee Harvey Oswald so that the public could see his
physical condition").
106 It is of course a bit ironic that a perp walk designed to demonstrate that Lee Harvey
Oswald was not being harmed culminated in Oswald's murder by Jack Ruby.
107 Chanoine, supra note 6, at 1369.
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tion against self-incrimination.""1 8 They would point out that, "[t]he physical
humiliation and 'onslaught of camera crews' is conducive to triggering 'excited
utterances' - statements qualifying as exceptions to the hearsay rule of evi-
dence."1 9 In addition, the perp walk has been criticized "as a form of imper-
missible pretrial punishment by shaming."" 0  As discussed above,"' perp
walks "undermine the presumption of innocence." ' 1 2 The device have also
been criticized as a "tool of 'croney-ism' - where the prosecution offers politi-
cally connected individuals the opportunity to turn themselves in, while those
lacking connections get 'trussed up... like a trophy."' Finally perp walks may
"serve[ ] 'a public desire for titillation,' "113 hardly a noble goal. These harms
caused by perp walks are manifest and clearly outweigh the purported
justifications.
IV. A PROSECUTOR'S RESPONSIBILITIES WHEN THE POLICE CONDUCT A
PERP WALK
Not all perp walks are orchestrated by prosecutors. Some perp walks are
initiated by police. Model Rule 3.8(f) requires prosecutors to "exercise reason-
able care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or
other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from
making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from
making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule."' "4 What are the responsibilities of prose-
cutors when the police orchestrate a perp walk?
There are two types of situations involving a police-instituted perp walk.
First, there will be times when the prosecutor will have a direct role in the
investigation and working closely with police. The second situation involves
police-instituted perp walks in which the prosecutor is not involved. The pros-
ecutor has ethical duties in both situations.
Prosecutors are getting more involved in criminal investigations." 15 If a
prosecutor works with police officers, the mandates of Model Rule 5.3 may
apply, as well as the requirements of Model Rule 3.8(f). Model Rule 5.3
applies "[w]ith respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated
with a lawyer."' 6 Model Rule 5.3 on its face applies, not merely to employees
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
I' See supra notes 33-90 and accompanying text.
12 Chanoine, supra note 6, at 1369.
113 Id.
114 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(0 (2005).
115 See e.g., Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of
Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1271 (2004) (stating that "[e]specially in the
federal system, prosecutors play a significant role in supervising proactive investigations");
Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their Investigative
Role, 68 FORDHiAM L. REV. 723, 724, 728 (1999) (stating that prosecutors "have become
increasingly involved in the investigative stages of criminal matters during the twentieth
century" and "are centrally involved in proactive criminal investigations").
116 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2005) (emphasis added).
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of a law firm or a government agency, 1 7 but also to individuals "associated"
with a lawyer. In regard to those individuals, a lawyer has a number of poten-
tial responsibilities. Model Rule 5.3 outlines the responsibilities of a lawyer
regarding nonlawyer assistants." 18 This has a number of consequences for
prosecutors working with police officers. First, under Model Rule 5.3(a), a
prosecutor who possesses, either "individually or together" with other prosecu-
tors "comparable managerial authority" to a law firm partner, has the duty to
ensure that the prosecutor's office "has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance" that the conduct of police personnel "is compatible with the profes-
sional obligations of the lawyer.""' Second, Model Rule 5.3(b) mandates that
a prosecutor having "direct supervisory authority over" a police officer must
"make reasonable efforts to ensure that the [police officer's] conduct is compat-
ible with the professional obligations of the [prosecutor]."' 2 ° Third, Model
Rule 5.3(c)(1) makes a prosecutor responsible for the unethical conduct of a
police officer if the prosecutor "orders or, with the knowledge of the specific
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved."' 2' Fourth, Model Rule 5.3(c)(2) makes
a prosecutor responsible for a police officer's conduct if the prosecutor has
managerial authority in the prosecutor's office or has "direct supervisory
authority" over the police officer and the prosecutor "knows of the conduct at a
time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take rea-
sonable remedial action."'
122
Finally, Model Rule 3.8(f) expands a prosecutor's responsibility for the
conduct of police officers even beyond the mandates of Model Rule 5.3. In
addition to the requirement that prosecutors "refrain from making extrajudicial
comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemna-
1"7 The Model Rules define a "law firm" to include "the legal department of a corporation
or other organization." Id. R. 1.0(c). The legal department of an "organization" includes the
legal department of a government agency. Id. R. 1.0 cmt. 3.
118 See id. R. 5.3, entitled "Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants," which states:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:
(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possess comparable
managerial authority in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the
lawyer; and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct
involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the
person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the con-
duct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable
remedial action.
I1 d. R. 5.3 (a).
120 Id. R. 5.3(b). Thus every prosecutor supervising a police officer during a criminal inves-
tigation must make reasonable efforts ensuring that the officer obeys the mandates of Rules
3.6 and 3.8(f).
121 Id. R. 5.3(c)(1).
122 Id. R. 5.3(c)(2).
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tion of the accused," Rule 3.8(f) requires that a prosecutor "exercise reasonable
care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other
persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from mak-
ing an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from
making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule."' 3 The interplay between Model Rule 5.3
and Rule 3.8(f) is further elucidated by Comment 6 to Model Rule 3.8:
Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to Rules 5.1 and 5.3, which relate to
responsibilities regarding lawyers and the nonlawyers who work for or are associated
with the lawyer's office. Paragraph (f) reminds the prosecutors of the importance of
these obligations in connection with the unique dangers of improper extrajudicial
statements in a criminal case. In addition, paragraph (f) requires a prosecutor to
exercise reasonable care to prevent persons assisting or associated with the prosecu-
tor from making improper extrajudicial statements, even when such persons are not
under the direct supervision of the prosecutor. Ordinarily, the reasonable care stan-
dard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law-enforce-
ment personnel and other relevant individuals.
124
Thus Model Rule 5.3 imposes duties on prosecutors who have managerial
authority in the prosecutor's office and prosecutors that have direct supervisory
authority over police officers. Model Rule 3.8(f), on the other hand, imposes
duties on every prosecutor working with police officers.
Applying the mandates of Model Rules 5.3 and 3.8(f) to perp walks allows
an examination of the following question: under what circumstances will a
prosecutor be responsible for a police-initiated perp walk, assuming the perp
walk, if arranged by the prosecutor, would violate either Model Rule 3.6 or
3.8(f)? First, under Model Rule 5.3(a), a prosecutor possessing managerial
authority must make "reasonable efforts to ensure" that the prosecutor's office
"has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance" that police officers do not
engage in improper perp walks. Under Model Rule 5.3(b), prosecutors super-
vising police officers during an investigation must "make reasonable efforts to
ensure" that the police officers do not conduct improper perp walks. Thus,
prosecutors who are managers or supervise police officers have a duty to edu-
cate police officers working with the prosecutor's office about the mandates of
Model Rules 3.6 and 3.8(f).125 Under Model Rule 5.3(c)(2), prosecutors with
managerial authority or direct supervisory authority over a police officer have a
duty to mitigate the effects of an improper perp walk committed by police
officers under their authority. Finally, under Model Rule 3.8(f), prosecutors
have a duty to "exercise reasonable care" to stop police officers from engaging
in improper perp walks.
What reasonable measures must prosecutors take and what constitutes
"reasonable care" to prevent police officers from engaging in improper perp
walks? As Comment 6 to Model Rule 3.8 states, "ordinarily the reasonable
care standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions
123 Id. R. 3.8(f).
124 Id. R. 3.8 cmt. 6.
125 See id. R. 5.3 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer must give such assistants appropriate instruction and
supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment..."); Id. at R. 3.8 cmt. 6
(Rule 3.8(f) "requires a prosecutor to exercise reasonable care to prevent persons assisting or
associated with the prosecutor from making improper extrajudicial statement, even when
such persons are not under the direct supervision of the prosecutor").
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to law-enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals."126 Prosecutors
should issue directives to police officers warning against improper perp walks.
However, what if the police department ignores the prosecutor's direc-
tives? Suppose the police department has a practice of engaging in improper
perp walks in high profile cases and ignores the prosecutor's pleas. Do prose-
cutors owe any other duty? A concept from employment discrimination law
can prove helpful.
In sexual harassment cases an employer will often be responsible for the
actions of a supervisor or even a low-level employee.' 27  Employers have
duties to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. If an employee sexually
harasses another employee, the employer has a duty to "take steps reasonably
likely to stop the harassment."'
' 28
The same test should be applied in regard to a prosecutor's duties under
Model Rules 5.3, 3.8(f) and 3.6. If a prosecutor issues "the appropriate cau-
tions" to police officers but they are ignored, then the prosecutor will have to
take other measures. If the prosecutor has some kind of supervisory authority
over police officers and has the authority to institute or recommend disciplinary
measures, then the prosecutor should do so. However, suppose a prosecutor
does not exercise supervisory authority over the police? Under those circum-
stances, good publicity can overcome bad publicity. If a police department is
obstinate in its use of perp walks, the prosecutor should issue a public state-
ment, perhaps at a press conference, in which the prosecutor condemns the
actions of the police, reminds the public that the accused is innocent until
proven guilty, and names the police officers involved in the improper conduct.
Indeed, under the duty to mitigate contained in Model Rule 5.3(c)(2), a prose-
126 Id. R. 3.8 cmt. 6.
127 Two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) established the principles
governing employer liability for a supervisor's sexual harassment of employees. Under
those cases, if the supervisor commits sexual harassment culminating in a "tangible employ-
ment action" against the employee, the employer is vicariously liable. Faragher, 524 U.S. at
808. A tangible employment action involves "a significant change in employment status,
such as hiring, firing failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsi-
bilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Indus., Inc., 524
U.S. at 761. However, if the harassment does not involve a tangible employment action, the
employer may establish an affirmative defense by proving: "(a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior[ ] and (b)
that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or cor-
rective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Faragher, 524
U.S. at 807.
128 Saxton v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 10 F.3d 526, 536 (7th Cir. 1993). See
also Cerros v. Steel Technologies, Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Williams
v. Waste Mgmt. of Ill., 361 F.3d 1021, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004) stating that to avoid liability, the
employer must take "prompt and appropriate corrective action reasonably likely to prevent
the harassment from recurring"); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating
that employer may rebut employee's showing of sexual harassment by "pointing to prompt
remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment"); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that employer acts unreasonably if the
remedial action it takes "is not reasonably likely to prevent the misconduct from recurring").
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cutor arguably has a duty to hold such a press conference anytime there is an
improper perp walk. 129
V. CONCLUSION
Perp walks are pernicious devices. They humiliate innocent defendants,
taint the jury pool, and titillate the public. They are sometimes used by police
officers and prosecutors to build careers. Although there is nothing to prevent
the media from taking photos in a public place, prosecutors and police should
not do anything to help them. 130 Prosecutorial ethics dictate that prosecutors
should not orchestrate perp walks and should instruct law enforcement person-
nel to refrain from doing so. If the police are under the prosecutor's supervi-
sion, the prosecutor should do whatever it takes, including instituting
disciplinary measures, to prevent the police from using the device. If the police
are not under the prosecutor's supervision and the police ignore the prosecu-
tor's directives to avoid perp walks, the prosecutor should publicly condemn
their actions. If prosecutors fail to meet these ethical obligations, disciplinary
authorities should hold them accountable.
129 This idea about countervailing publicity came from a colleague of mine, Professor Rob-
ert Banks, Jr., in a discussion during a very nice sushi dinner.
130 Arguably, prosecutors should make reasonable efforts to protect defendants in custody
from prejudicial pretrial publicity.
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